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In this paper, we analyze whether the recent global process of strengthening
and harmonization of intellectual property rights (IPRs) affects decisions of
cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We investigate if IPRs have
a differential effect across sectors of different technology content and for
countries of different development level. Also, we study how imitation abilities
of target countries interact with the tightening of IPRs. Using data for the
post-TRIPS period (1995-2010), we estimate an extended gravity model to study
the bilateral number of M&As, including a measure of the strength of IPRs
systems on target countries and a set of control variables usually considered
as determinants of M&As. The estimation results verify the gravity structure for
M&As and show that IPRs –and enforcement– influence decisions of cross-border
M&As in all sectors regardless of their technological content. However, IPRs
are more important in countries with high imitation abilities and in sectors
of high-technology content. Furthermore, a strengthening of IPRs leads to a
larger increase of M&As in developing countries than in developed countries.
These results call the attention on the possible implications for least developed
economies and challenge the adequacy of a globally harmonized IPRs systems.
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1. Introduction
The recent process of harmonization and strengthening of intellectual property
rights (IPRs) systems is expected to have implications for global relations
among countries (Maskus 2012). However, the effect of IPRs on international
trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), technology transfer, and mergers and
acquisitions (M&As) is not clear either from a theoretical perspective or from
an empirical point of view (Maskus and Penubarti 1995; Maskus 2000; Foley
et al. 2006; Campi and Duen˜as 2016).
In the case of cross-border M&As, intellectual property (IP) assets are often
a relevant part of the value of the target firm and the desire of a firm to
access them might be a significant driving force behind a deal. Nevertheless,
economic theory sheds an ambiguous light on the relation between IPRs and
M&As, especially, at the country level. The effect of IPRs on M&As is mediated
by several trade-offs that explain the difficulty of determining the expected
effects. Also, IPRs affect not only the decisions of firms to engage in M&As
but also to license technologies or export, which can be complementary or
substitutes. In addition, the threat of imitation that derives from different
capabilities of countries is often identified as a critical feature shaping the
effects of IPRs (Smith 1999; Connolly 2003; Helpman 2006). Moreover, the
technology content of sectors (Mansfield 1995), and the development level of
countries (Helpman 1993) that imply a set of particular features, are also likely
to differently influence M&As.
In the last decades, the growth of FDI at higher growth rates than
trade and GDP has been one of the main characteristics of the process
of globalization (Feenstra 1998; Brakman et al. 2010). Cross-border M&As
account for a large share of FDI.1 Simultaneously, the signing of the agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects on Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1994 led
to a process of global diffusion and tightening of IPRs systems. In this process,
developed countries (DCs) have increased the level of existing IP protection
and developing or less developed countries (LDCs) have either adopted new
systems or adapted their existing systems to the “minimum standards”
demanded by the TRIPS. The scope of IP protection has also been broadened,
reaching sectors or products, such as plant varieties, micro-organisms, and
pharmaceutical products, which were often excluded from IP protection.
This paper explores whether the strengthening of IPRs systems during
1According to UNCTAD (2001), M&As represented around 80% of the world FDI in 2000.
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the post-TRIPS period (1995-2010) has affected decisions of M&As using
an extended gravity model and considering the strength of IPRs systems in
target countries as a possible determinant of cross-border M&As. We analyze
this phenomenon at the country level as we are interested both in the global
diffusion of IPRs systems and cross-border M&As as part of a more general
globalization process.
We use a large set of countries and include control variables usually
considered as determinants of M&As, as well as country and country-pairs
fixed effects in order to control for endogeneity derived from unobserved
characteristics. With the aim of providing more robust evidence, we consider
the technological content of sectors, an indicator of enforcement of IPRs, the
imitation abilities of countries, and their development levels.
The effect of IPRs is usually sector-specific (Mansfield 1995; Cohen
et al. 2000; Smarzynska 2004; Nunnenkamp and Spatz 2004). For example,
some sectors of high-technology content, such as pharmaceuticals, are
expected to be more affected by changes in IPRs. In order to take into
account a possible differential effect of IPRs for different sectors, we split
our data on M&As into four groups of different technology content: (i)
agri-food; (ii) low-technology industries; (iii) medium-technology industries;
and (iv) high-technology industries. In order to consider specific features of
manufactures and agricultural products, we use two different measures of IPRs
systems: the index of patent protection of Ginarte and Park (1997), updated
by Park (2008), for the manufacturing sector, and the index of IP protection
for the agri-food sector, developed by Campi and Nuvolari (2015). We also
control for differences in the enforcement of IPRs using an indicator of the
strength of the legal system and property rights, and analyzing its interaction
with the strength of IPRs systems.
In addition, we consider the interaction between IPRs systems and imitation
abilities of target countries. We argue that this interaction will depend on
the technology content of sectors because high imitation abilities in the target
countries might be more likely to discourage firms from doing cross-border
M&As, trade, or technology transfer in sectors of medium- and high-technology
content. In these sectors, an increase in IP protection could be more important
for firms engaging in M&As. Conversely, in sectors in which products can be
easily copied, regardless of the imitation abilities of countries, the interaction
could be less relevant.
Finally, we consider that the effect of IPRs might also depend on the
3
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development level of countries. This may happen for several reasons. Firstly,
the relevance of agriculture and manufactures of different technology content
is different for DCs and LDCs. Secondly, DCs used to have in place strong
IPRs systems well before the TRIPS agreement, while LDCs are more recently
adopting strong IP protection systems. Most LDCs were reluctant to tighten
their IPRs systems and the actual strengthening was not an endogenous
response to domestic innovation, while several DCs were the ones pushing for
uniform reforms across countries (Delgado et al. 2013). And, thirdly, several
studies have found differential effects of IPRs for DCs and LDCs (Seyoum 1996;
McManis 1997; Kalanje 2002).
Overall, we find that the strengthening of IPRs systems increases the
number of cross-border M&As, for all the sectors considered regardless of their
technological content. These results are robust when we consider a proxy of the
enforcement capacity of countries together with their IPRs systems. We also
find that the positive effect of IPRs on M&As is stronger when the increase in
IPRs takes place in a LDC, compared with DCs. Finally, we find that the effect
of stronger IPRs depends on the imitation abilities of countries –being more
relevant in countries with high imitation abilities– but also that this interaction
is more important in sectors of medium- and high-technology content.
These results are robust to different specifications that control for
endogeneity and allow to conclude that differences in technologies, imitation
abilities, and development levels of countries are important to determine the
effect of IPRs on M&As. This has relevant implications in the context of the
global strengthening and harmonization of IPRs systems.
In the first place, both the threat of imitation and the development level
of countries influence decisions of M&As in response to national differences
in IPRs. The interaction between imitation abilities of target countries and
technological content of sectors is heterogeneous, being more important for
sectors of high-technology content (see: Shin et al. 2016, for the case of trade).
Moreover, the effect on developing countries is stronger compared to the effect
on developed countries. All this implies that specific features of countries and
sectors are relevant for the design of IPRs systems and challenges the idea of
a one size fits all system as the one promoted by the TRIPS. In other words,
given the heterogeneous effects, the results challenge the adequacy of globally
harmonized IPRs systems that do not consider technological capabilities and
development levels of countries.
Finally, given that whether FDI is beneficial for developing countries does
4
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not have a unique answer and is a matter of debate (Helpman 1993; Yi and
Naghavi 2017), a concerned policy maker should consider whether M&As are
a desirable form of investment for different LDCs. In particular, considering
that stronger IPRs attract more M&As in LDCs compared with DCs, and that
the increase of M&As derived from stronger IPRs is observed across all sectors
and not necessarily imply technology transfer.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
we briefly discuss the possible determinants of M&As, we analyze how IPRs
are expected to influence firms’ decisions of M&As, and review the empirical
evidence. In Section 3, we analyze the data. In Section 4, we explore the effect
of IPRs on bilateral flows of M&As. Finally, in Section 5, we discuss the main
findings and provide general conclusions.
2. Determinants of M&As and the effect of IPRs
A firm that aims to access a foreign market faces different choices. It can export
a product, manufacture it locally by undertaking FDI –which in turn can mean
doing a greenfield or a brownfield investment–, license the product to a firm in
the host country, or undertake a joint venture involving joint production or a
technology-sharing agreement (Fink and Maskus 2005; Helpman 2006). These
decisions are not made independently from each other, nor they are exclusive.
Several empirical studies have investigated the determinants of M&As
and FDI (for an extensive survey see: Blonigen 1997). Most of the existing
contributions focus on the macroeconomic causes of FDI and the obstacles to
capital flows, such as financial markets failures and asymmetric information,
and on specific features of countries (Hyun and Kim 2010).
Empirical studies find that the more relevant determinants of M&As are:
1) GDP and market size (Brakman et al. 2010), 2) geographical distance as a
proxy of transportation and transaction costs (Brakman et al. 2010), 3) cultural
differences (Erel et al. 2012), 4) financial market development (Di Giovanni
2005), 5) openness to trade and economic integration (Cuevas et al. 2005; Hyun
and Kim 2010), 6) quality of institutions (Rossi and Volpin 2004; Courdacier
et al. 2009; Hyun and Kim 2010; Hur et al. 2011), and 7) exchange rates
volatility (Blonigen 1997; Brakman et al. 2010).
In addition, intangible assets such as patents, trademarks, and trade secrets
are a part of the value of the target firm in M&As. Therefore, several scholars
agree that a relevant driving force behind M&As deals is the acquirer’s desire
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to obtain the target’s IP assets (Bryer and Simensky 2002; Marco and Rausser
2002). For example, Marco and Rausser (2002) show that M&As of major
agricultural business suppliers are designed to expand the IPRs portfolio. This
is not surprising if we consider certain firms’ behaviors related with IPRs
such as patent blocking or the creation of patent thickets, which can generate
incentives for firms to acquire other firms that hold strategic IPRs (Bessen
2003; Cohen et al. 2000). Then, we might expect that not only access to IPRs
assets but also IPRs systems protecting these assets might induce M&As.
Being a relevant part of the general regulatory system, IPRs systems can
affect the investment climate (Fink and Maskus 2005). However, Maskus (2000)
argues that IPRs systems alone cannot explain how firms decide to invest,
trade, or license a product to a certain country, as firms’ decisions are influenced
by other factors, such as internationalization advantages that derive from
market power, market size, as well as transportation, transaction, and labor
costs. These factors, together with financial variables and the institutional
system, are usually different in countries of different development level. Thus,
the effect of IPRs on M&As may also be affected differently by the level of
development of the countries involved in the deals.
Theoretically, the relation between IPRs and FDI, including M&As, is
ambiguous. Strong IPRs may encourage firms with IP assets or knowledge
intensive products to trade, invest, and license because IPRs reduce the risk
of imitation. But the effect of lower imitation risk of licensed technologies may
reduce incentives for FDI and, instead, increase incentives to trade (Yang and
Maskus 2001).
In order to study the welfare effects of tighter IPRs systems, Helpman (1993)
builds a model of general equilibrium of two regions, North and South, where
innovation takes place in the North while the South imitates technologies
invented in the North. He shows that strengthening IPRs increases FDI in
both regions, but he concludes that whether this is desirable, cannot be
answered theoretically. Tighter IPRs hurt the South, while the effect in the
North depends on the existence of small imitation rates. Likewise, Yi and
Naghavi (2017) show that in less developed countries, IPRs should be just
strong enough to induce FDI since international technology spillovers are the
dominant source of technological development. Instead, a stronger level of IP
protection is recommended for more advanced emerging economies as a tool
to exploit the potential of their domestic innovators.
Empirically, the effect of IPRs on M&As has been less thoroughly studied.
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The evidence is mostly gathered from FDI data and it is not conclusive. Several
authors find a positive effect of IPRs on FDI. Using a gravity model, Smith
(2001) finds a positive link between IPRs and both FDI and licensing of
US firms, although this holds for middle-income countries and large LDCs,
but not for small and low-income countries. Both Lesser (2002) and Adams
(2010) find a positive correlation among IPRs and FDI inflows to LDCs.
Foley et al. (2006) study the effect of IPRs reforms on US multinationals,
finding that stronger IPRs increase technology transfer and the level and
growth rate of non-resident patenting. Ahammad et al. (2018) find that the
greater the strength of IP protection in target economies and higher the target
firms’ research and development (R&D) capabilities, the more likely it is for
multinational companies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China to undertake
partial, rather than full acquisitions.
On the contrary, other authors find a negative or not significant correlation
between IPRs and FDI. Seyoum (1996) explores the relation between IPRs
and FDI before the signing of the TRIPS. He finds no significant relation
for LDCs, but he observes a positive effect of trademarks and copyrights
and a negative effect of patent protection, on investment decisions for DCs.
Fink (2005) investigates the effect of IPRs on exports, FDI, and licensing
arrangements made by German and American multinationals. He finds no
effect of stronger IPRs, except for a negative link between IPRs and sales
in the chemical industry. Nicholson (2007) estimates the impact of IPRs on
the composition of sector-specific multinational activity. He argues that firms
in industries with high capital costs are more likely to maintain control over
production knowledge through FDI in countries with weak IP protection.
Conversely, firms in industries that are intensive in R&D are more likely to
engage in licensing when IPRs systems are strong.
Overall, IPRs systems may affect the decisions of firms to trade, invest,
or license technologies in several ways. From the acquirers’ perspective, IPRs
can reduce imitation threat inducing M&As. But imitation abilities depend
not only on IP protection but also on the capabilities of firms to master new
technologies and both tacit and codified knowledge. Therefore, the effect of
IP protection systems needs to consider imitation abilities of target countries
because the interaction between imitation threat and IPRs systems is likely to
affect the decisions of firms to export or to invest abroad. For the case of trade,
Smith (1999) shows that, depending on the sector, low and high imitation
threat, and weak and strong IPRs systems, can produce a market expansion
7
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effect –increasing exports–, a market power effect –decreasing exports–, or
could have an ambiguous effect that needs to be empirically determined.
In fact, when imitation abilities are low, weak IPRs could be beneficial
for both partners because this combination might encourage foreign firms
to engage in joint-ventures and license agreements with domestic firms, as
well as simply trade, promoting technology transfer to the domestic market.
However, the market power that derives from IPRs might induce firms to
reduce sales and increase prices, preventing access to new technologies and
hindering further innovation. How IPRs influence decisions of firms is mediated
by several trade-offs, which explain the difficulty to predict this effect a priori.
In addition, the effect of IPRs usually depends on the sector. Mansfield
(1995) shows that firms in the chemical, electrical equipment, pharmaceutical,
and machinery sectors are more likely to be affected by IPRs. Smarzynska
(2004) argues that weak IPRs systems have the largest deterring effect on FDI
in four technology-intensive sectors: drugs, cosmetics and health care products,
chemicals, machinery and equipment, and electrical equipment. Moreover,
the decision to trade, undertake FDI, or license can also be sector-specific.
Nicholson (2007) argues that firms with natural barriers to imitation tend
to choose licensing, while firms vulnerable to imitation tend to choose FDI.
Stronger IPRs systems can cause substitution between these modes.
Since the effect of IPRs remains ambiguous, we contribute to this literature
with further empirical evidence on whether IPRs systems in target countries
affect decisions of M&As. We use a gravity model to explain cross-border M&As
including IPRs systems and a set of control variables. To our knowledge, this is
the first study that considers the strength of IPRs systems in target countries as
a possible determinant of M&As using a gravity specification for a large set of
countries. Also, while most studies focus on a few variables that affect M&As,
we include a set of variables, which are considered determinants of M&As in
the related literature. In addition, we assess the effect of IPRs on M&As in
sectors with different technology content and we study the interaction between
IPRs systems and imitation abilities as well as development levels of countries.
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3. Data
3.1. Mergers and acquisitions
Data of M&As are from Worldwide Mergers, Acquisitions, and Alliances
Databases SDC Platinum (Thomson Reuters). The database reports both the
number of transactions and their values in nominal dollars, although in a large
number of cases, firms do not disclose the value of the deals. We deflated
cross-border flows of M&As using the US imports price index provided by the
US Bureau of Labor Statistics and we obtain M&As in constant 2000 dollars.2
Factors driving both the number and value of M&As are expected to be
very similar. In fact, the correlation of their evolution in our database is as
high as 0.91. We use both the number of transactions and their values for the
empirical analysis, and we use the number of transactions for the econometric
estimations in order to have a higher number of observations.
Figure 1 depicts the evolution of the volumes in millions (MM) of US dollars
(left axis) and the number of total cross-border M&As (right axis) between
1995 and 2010, for the full sample of countries (left), for inflows to DCs
(middle), and to LDCs (right).3
Figure 1.: Evolution of inflows of cross-border M&As. Total (left), developed
countries (center), and developing countries (right)
The time series display two peaks, which derive from the “wave-like”
behavior of cross-border M&As, characterized by substantial variation over
time, produced by periods of rapid growth and periods of rapid decline
(Brakman et al. 2010). Cross-border M&As increased between 1995 and 2000,
and then decreased until 2003. After this downturn, M&As recovered until
2http://www.bls.gov/web/ximpim/beaexp.htm, accessed on February 2015.
3The classification of countries according to development level is based on United
Nations. See: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2012country_
class.pdf (accessed on March 2015). See Appendix A for the list of countries).
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2007 and decreased thereafter. This behavior characterizes the evolution of
both the number and the value of transactions. Inflows of M&As to DCs almost
replicate the behavior of total M&As and inflows to LDCs have been increasing,
especially since 2002, before the beginning of the second wave.4
Following the classification of Lall (2000) and OECD (2011) as a
baseline, we have classified the data in four groups of M&As: (i) agri-food;
(ii) low-technology industries; (iii) medium-technology industries; and (iv)
high-technology industries.
There exist several ways of categorizing industries by technology
intensity. Pavitt (1984) made a relevant effort, distinguishing between
resource-based, labour-intensive, scale-intensive, differentiated and
science-based manufactures. Lall (2000) improved this classification, arguing
that the analytical distinctions of Pavitt are unclear and present large
overlaps among categories. The OECD (2011) uses four categories: high-,
medium-high, medium-low, and low technology. This classification is based
on direct R&D intensity, and R&D embodied in intermediate and investment
goods (Hatzichronoglou 1997).
We must highlight that Lall (2000) considers the technological content of
products while our classification is for industrial sectors. In order to create our
groups, we first connected the sectors identified by SIC codes in the M&As
database and the groups defined by the OECD (2011) that correspond to
the ISIC Rev.3.5 As both Lall (2000) and the OECD (2011) warn, there
is a certain amount of subjectivity in assigning industries to categories. For
example, high-technology industries can produce a variety of products ranging
between low- and high-technology. Also, countries might have slightly different
classifications using the same method. However, all these possible drawbacks
are present in any given classification and are not expected to affect our
research. See Appendix B for the classification.
3.2. Intellectual property rights systems
To measure the strength of IPRs systems, for the manufacturing sector, we
consider the widely used patent protection index of Ginarte and Park (1997)
4This process was deepened in more recent years, see: Gaffney et al. (2016).
5To do this, we applied a concordance between the ISIC and the NAICS, and between
the NAICS and the SIC codes, since there is no direct concordance between the SIC and
the ISIC. See: http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/PAGE/HAVEMAN/Trade.Resources/
TradeConcordances.html, accessed on December 2015.
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and updated by Park (2008). For the agri-food sector, we use a yearly index
developed by Campi and Nuvolari (2015), which is an indicator of the strength
of IP protection in agriculture that considers its specific features.6 These
indexes aggregate different components that indicate the strength of each
country’s IP protection system in the manufacturing sector and the agri-food
sector, respectively.7
The index of Ginarte and Park (1997) considers five categories of the patent
laws in each country: (i) extent of coverage, (ii) membership in international
patent agreements, (iii) provisions for loss of protection, (iv) enforcement
mechanisms, and (v) duration of protection. Similarly, the index of Campi
and Nuvolari (2015) consists of five components that define the strength of
IP protection in the agricultural sector: (i) ratification of UPOV conventions;
(ii) farmers’ exception; (iii) breeders’ exception; (iv) protection length; and
(v) patent scope, which defines whether patents are accepted in five related
domains (food, micro-organisms, plant and animals, pharmaceutical products,
and plant varieties).
In both indexes, each of the categories or components were scored with a
normalized value ranging from 0 to 1. The unweighted sum of these five values
constitutes the overall score of each index, which ranges from 0 to 5, with
higher values of the indexes indicating stronger levels of IP protection. The
main advantage of using these two indexes is that they provide a yearly measure
of the strength of IP protection for a large sample of countries.8
Table 1 shows an increase in the average values of the indexes over time. IPRs
in LDCs have been increasing at higher growth rates and, although the gap
between the level of IPRs in DCs and LDCs has narrowed, the last five-years
period still shows a higher average level of IP protection in DCs. Also, there has
been a decrease in the within variation –observed in the standard deviations.
This evolution reflects the process of strengthening and harmonization of IPRs
systems that has been taking place since the signing of the TRIPS. Given that
6Dealing with living organisms, the agri-food sector presents specificities (compared to
manufacturing sectors), which derive in the use of specific related IPRs. For example, plant varieties
are mainly protected by plant breeders’ rights, rather than by patents.
7Both indexes of IPRs probably capture different dimensions of a general IP attitude existing
in each country and, therefore, they are positively correlated. However, each index was constructed
considering specific features of the sectors and for this reason it is more appropriate to use them for
each corresponding sector. We conducted several robustness checks that prove the advantage of using
the indexes as we do. The results are available upon request.
8Although the index of Ginarte and Park (1997) is available at five-year intervals, we have
assumed that the index remains unchanged during the intervals and replicated the values for the
missing years. For example, we have used the value of the index in 1995 for all the years between
1996 and 1999. This allows us to take advantage of all available data on M&As flows.
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Table 1.: Average value of intellectual property protection
Agriculture Manufacture
All countries DCs LDCs All countries DCs LDCs
1995-1999 1.81(0.99) 2.31(0.89) 1.46(0.91) 2.58(1.09) 3.90(0.76) 2.17(0.82)
2000-2004 2.60(1.01) 2.93(0.83) 2.36(1.08) 3.06(1.01) 4.19(0.54) 2.72(0.85)
2005-2009 3.05(0.92) 3.20(0.78) 2.94(1.01) 3.37(0.89) 4.38(0.34) 3.05(0.76)
Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis.
we are interested in whether IPRs attract M&As, we consider the indexes of
the target countries.
3.3. Enforcement
It is important to note that the indexes of IPRs systems measure their
regulatory aspect but do not address how the enforcement related aspects
work in practice (Papageorgiadis and McDonald 2018). Although, enforcement
necessarily determines the overall effect of the regulatory aspects of IPRs
systems, systematic information on the actual enforcement at the country
level is not available. A few studies addressing the application of enforcement
mechanisms are only available for a limited number of countries or years (for
example, see: Papageorgiadis et al. 2014).
Probably, a good proxy of enforcement could be constructed using data on
litigation for IPRs infringement. However, most IPRs infringement cases are
settled out of court, often prior to official filing and only a few countries have
data on the cases that are actually filled in courts of law (Connolly 2003).
An alternative proxy would be provided by the application of the rule of law
at a more general level given that we might expect enforcement of IPRs to be
correlated with the rule of law and general regulatory enforcement of countries
(Brander et al. 2017).
Thus, we use as a proxy of enforcement an indicator of the strength of
the legal system and property rights, which is an index that considers: (i)
judicial independence, (ii) impartial courts, (iii) protection of property rights,
(iv) military interference in rule of law and politics, (v) integrity of the legal
system, (vi) legal enforcement of contracts, (vii) regulatory costs of the sale of
real property, (viii) reliability of policy, and (ix) business cost of crime. The
12
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index ranges from 0 to 10 with higher values indicating stronger legal systems
for policy enforcement.9 We normalize the value of the index dividing it by 10
in order to have a scaling factor between 0 and 1 that allows us to correct the
level of the strength of IPRs by the enforcement.
3.4. Imitation abilities
Following Smith (1999, 2001), we use data of R&D expenditure as a percentage
of the GDP to classify countries in two groups with high imitation abilities
(R&D/GDP>0.5) and with low imitation abilities (R&D/GDP≤0.5). Given
that data are not available for all years and countries, we construct a dummy
variable to classify countries in these two groups, taking the average of the
information reported for the period 1995-2010. The data are from the World
Development Indicators and UNESCO Institute for Statistics.10
Not surprisingly, according to this classification, most DCs have high
imitation abilities given that their investments in R&D as a percentage of the
GDP is well above the threshold of 0.5. For example, on average for 1995-2010,
investments reached 3.45% in Sweden, 3.22% in Finland, 3.05% in Japan, and
2.59% in the United States. Instead, most LDCs have low imitation abilities,
but also many of them invest more than 0.5% of their GDP. For example,
China (1.1%), Brazil (1.04%), India (0.75%), and Hong Kong (0.65%).
We use this proxy for imitation abilities to explore the interaction of this
feature with the strengthening of IPRs at the country level. We expect that a
strengthening of IPRs in countries with low imitation threat would have a lower
impact on attracting M&As compared to a tightening of IPRs in countries with
high imitation threat.
But also, we expect that the interaction between IPRs and imitation
abilities will depend on the technology content of sectors. We argue that a
strengthening of IPRs in sectors of low-technology content will have a similar
effect on countries of both low and high imitation abilities. This is because
the threat of imitation is not expected to be very different if products can
be easily copied. Thus, the effect would be ambiguous, depending on other
country characteristics. Meanwhile, in sectors of high-technology content, a
strengthening of IPRs system will be expected to have a higher impact on
countries of high imitation abilities compared to a tightening of IPRs in
9See: www.fraserinstitute.org
10See WDI: http://databank.worldbank.org/ and UNESCO Institute for Statistics (UIS): data.
uis.unesco.org/.
13
August 29, 2018 The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development manuscript
countries of low imitation abilities. This is because, for the acquirer firm, the
threat of imitation on a country with low imitation abilities is already low,
even in the presence of weak IPRs.
4. M&As and IPRs: a gravity model
The gravity model has been largely used to explain bilateral trade flows
using GDP and the geographical distance between two countries as the main
explanatory variables (see Anderson 2011, for a review). In addition, gravity
models allow for the consideration of other possible determinants at the country
level, such as trade barriers, openness to trade, cultural differences, trade
agreements, and transaction and transportation costs.
Only recently, the gravity model started being used to explain cross-border
M&As given that market size, trade barriers, and economic distance are
critical for understanding bilateral flows (see, for example: Di Giovanni 2005;
Courdacier et al. 2009; Brakman et al. 2010; Duen˜as et al. 2017). Given the
volatility of M&As time series, explaining them with gravity specifications
might be more challenging than in the case of trade (Herger et al. 2008; Wong
2008). However, a number of studies have succeeded in fitting and predicting
M&As reasonably well with a gravity model (see: Blonigen 2005).
4.1. Methodology
In this section, we perform a gravity model estimation to explore the possible
effect of IPRs on the number of M&As.11 We use as our benchmark specification
the following equation:
MAij,k(t) = exp{xij,k(t) · βk}ηij,k(t), (1)
where MAij,k(t) denotes the number of M&As from the acquirer country i to
the target country j, in sector k, in the year t, and
xij,k(t) = {Zi, Zj , Dij , IPj,k,Wi,Wj , XRij , γi, γj , γij , γt}; (2)
11We also performed econometric estimations using the value of M&As finding complementary
results, which are available upon request.
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i, j = 1, ..., N ; Z = {log(GDP), log(pop)} is a vector of country-specific
variables including GDP and total population; D = {log(dist), contig, comlang,
comcol, colony} is a vector with bilateral-specific variables that includes
geographical distance (dist), and variables indicating geographical, economic,
and cultural barriers between both countries (contiguity, common language,
common colonizer, colonial link); and IPj,k = {IPRj,k} includes two indexes
of IP protection of the target country j, that are used in independent
estimations for sectors k, the index of Campi and Nuvolari (2015) for the
agri-food sector, and the index of Ginarte and Park (1997), updated by
Park (2008), for the three manufacturing sectors of low-, medium- and
high-technological content. To control for other determinants of M&As, we
use W = {log(open tra), fin open,h cap,polity}, a vector with country-specific
variables that includes openness to trade, an index of financial openness, human
capital, and political system; and XR = {xr} that is the coefficient of variation
of the bilateral exchange rate. Finally, γi and γj are country dummies for the
acquirers and the targets, respectively, γij is a set of dyadic dummies, and γt
is a set of time dummies. It is assumed that E[ηij |Zi, Zj , Dij , ...] = 1.
We include GDP and population as indicators of market size, which is
usually associated with a positive effect on M&As. The effect of distance is
expected to depend on the type of products. Some models predict that sectors
like agri-food and low-technology manufactures might be more affected by
distance because these sectors include perishable and relatively bulkier goods
(Frankel et al. 1995). Also, distance can have both a negative or a positive
effect on M&As depending on the motivation for the transaction. For example,
tariff-jumping investment could be positively associated with distance, because
it can reduce the transportation costs of exporting. Conversely, market-seeking
or outsourcing investments could be negatively related to physical distance,
because they are complementary to trade (Hyun and Kim 2010). Other
variables that indicate cultural and geographical proximity and are expected
to increase bilateral trade flows are contiguity, sharing a common language, or
having a common colonizer or a colonial link.
The coefficient of variation of the bilateral exchange rates is computed yearly
using monthly data of bilateral exchange rates. We use it as an indicator
of macroeconomic volatility, which is expected to negatively affect M&As.
Openness to trade may both increase or decrease M&As given that it also
affects firms’ exports decisions. Financial openness is an index that measures
the degree of capital account openness of a country. It is based on binary
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dummy variables that codify the tabulation of restrictions on cross-border
financial transactions (Chinn and Ito 2008, 2014). Financial openness is
expected to increase M&As.
Human capital is an index that considers the average years of schooling
and the returns to education. We use it as an indicator of the capabilities
of a country and probably of imitation abilities. As such, it could have both
a positive or a negative effect, because imitation abilities could discourage
M&As but higher capabilities could increase M&As. Finally, political system
is an indicator that measures the degree of democracy versus autocracy and
we use it as a proxy of the quality of institutions, which might increase M&As.
Table 2 describes the variables, data sources, and the expected effects.
The estimation of Equation (1) involves some econometric challenges mainly
derived from its non-linearity. Borrowing from the empirical evidence on
international trade, difficulties might be due to heteroscedasticity, the need
of a special treatment for zero-valued flows (Santos Silva and Tenreyro 2006;
Duen˜as and Fagiolo 2013), endogeneity, and omitted-variable bias (Baldwin
and Taglioni 2006). These difficulties rule out OLS estimates given that they
require a log-linearization of the gravity equation that might lead to biased
and inefficient estimations.
One possible source of endogeneity in our model may be IPRs systems.
However, there are no theoretical reasons to believe that the indexes are not
independent from the level of M&As, neither that M&As are likely to cause
the level of IPRs. Several authors agree that the increase in IP protection
after the signing of the TRIPS agreement can be considered exogenous (Ivus
2010; Delgado et al. 2013). The main reason is that the TRIPS agreement
was included in a package of agreements whose acceptance was a compulsory
requirement of the World Trade Organization (WTO) membership. Thus, the
decision of signing the TRIPS and the implications on IPRs systems might not
be seen as determined at the country level, but rather by an external body.
In this sense, IPRs systems in the post-TRIPS period might be reasonable
regarded as “exogenous” (Delgado et al. 2013).
Thus, endogeneity is not a problem up to a certain extent. In fact, the
TRIPS agreement establishes certain minimum standards –which are quite
high compared to the previous systems– and provides countries the freedom
to choose the final design of their IPRs systems. This implies that there are
individual reasons for countries to adopt a certain level of IP protection. In
order to control for this possible source of endogeneity and also to reduce the
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Table 2.: Variables: expected effects, description, and sources
Label Related
to
Expected
effect
Description Source
MA Bilateral Number of M&As SDC Platinum
(Thomson Reuters)
IPRs systems
IPRagri-food Country + Index of agricultural IPRs Campi and Nuvolari
(2015)
IPRmanuf. Country + Index of patent protection Ginarte and Park
(1997); Park (2008)
Enforcement Country + Index of legal system and property
rights
Fraser Institute1
Country-specific variables
GDP Country + Gross domestic product Feenstra et al. (2013)
pop Country + Country population CEPII2
Geographical and cultural variables
dist Bilateral +/- Distance between two countries,
based on bilateral distances
between the largest cities of those
two countries, weighted by the
share of the city in the overall
country’s population
CEPII2
contig Bilateral + Contiguity dummy equal to 1 if
two countries share a common
border
CEPII2
comlang Bilateral + Dummy equal to 1 if both countries
share a common official language
CEPII2
comcol Bilateral + Dummy equal to 1 if both countries
have had a common colonizer
CEPII2
colony Bilateral + Dummy equal to 1 if both countries
have ever had a colonial link
CEPII2
Control variables
xr Bilateral - Bilateral exchange rate coefficient
of variation
International Financial
Statistics (IMF)3
fin open Country + Index of financial openness Chinn and Ito (2008,
2014)
open tra Country +/- Openness to trade (Trade % of
GDP)
WDI4
h cap Country +/- Index of human capital Feenstra et al. (2013)
polity Country + Political System Systemic Peace5
Note: 1: www.fraserinstitute.org, 2: www.cepii.fr, 3: www.imf.org/en/Data, 4: http://databank.
worldbank.org/, 5: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
probability of omitted variable bias, we include several time varying covariates,
which are theoretically expected to influence M&As. Additionally, in order to
avoid an omitted variable bias, we perform robustness exercises using different
specifications that control if the coefficient estimates are stable. We also use
origin and destinations dummies (fixed effects) to control individual reasons
of countries to adopt stronger IPRs, and dyadic dummies in order to control
17
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bilateral fixed effects.
Finally, the presence of zeros in the database is very high, even if we
use the number of transactions. Thus, we perform the estimations using a
count data model for the number of M&As, including zeros. Count data
models are in advantage of log-linearized models because they better control
heteroscedasticity and the presence of zeros (Santos Silva and Tenreyro
2006).12 The statistical tests determined that the Poisson Pseudo Maximum
Likelihood (PPML) estimation performs better than the Negative Binomial
(NB) estimation for all sectors and specifications.13 Then, we have performed
independent estimations of Equation (1) using a PPML method for the four
samples of M&As classified according to technology intensity.
4.2. Estimation results
Table 3 displays the results of the PPML estimations of the number of M&As.
We have estimated two models for each of the four sectors. In model (1), we
used the baseline specification of the gravity model extended with the IPRs
indexes. In model (2), we also included the set of control variables that are
expected to influence M&As.
The estimated coefficients of IPRs in the baseline specifications (1) show that
the strengthening of IPRs systems increases the number of M&As in all sectors
regardless their technological content. It is interesting to note that when we
include the set of control variables in models (2), the effect of IPRs is still
positive and significant for all the sectors, except for agri-food. This means
that IPRs systems affect M&As even when considering other factors that also
influence decisions of M&As.
In both specifications, we observe that most of the usual variables related to
the gravity equation are significant and present the expected signs. A higher
GDP, an indicator of market size or potential demand, of both the acquirer
and the target, leads to a higher number of deals. M&As decrease when
the population of the target grows, while population of the acquirer is not
significant, except in the low-technology sector.
For all sectors, the estimated coefficients of distance are negative, which
12Another possible way of dealing with the excess of zeros would be to estimate the gravity model
using a Zero-Inflated Count Data Model, as suggested by Burger et al. (2009) for the case of trade.
However, for our data and given that we use country and bilateral fixed effects, it was not possible
to achieve convergence in most specifications of the model.
13The over-dispersion parameter (α) of the NB estimation was always statistically not different
from zero. Therefore, the PPML estimation method is preferred over the NB.
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Table 3.: PPML estimations of the number of cross-border M&As with country
dummies (MAij,k ≥ 0)
Sector Agri-food Low-technology Medium-technology High-technology
Model (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
IPRs systems
IPRj,agri−food 0.181*** 0.100
(0.051) (0.062)
IPRj,manufacture 0.663*** 0.558*** 0.682*** 0.370*** 0.497*** 0.436***
(0.090) (0.113) (0.083) (0.078) (0.104) (0.098)
Country-specific variables
ln(GDPi) 0.518** 0.769*** 1.364*** 1.472*** 1.451*** 1.453*** 1.030*** 1.286***
(0.212) (0.240) (0.182) (0.222) (0.157) (0.172) (0.212) (0.241)
ln(GDPj) 1.312*** 1.914*** 0.629** 0.865** 1.466*** 1.663*** 1.376*** 1.378***
(0.381) (0.492) (0.318) (0.403) (0.269) (0.131) (0.389) (0.191)
ln(popi) 0.144 0.445 -0.520 1.132** -0.728 -0.421 -0.125 0.482
(0.624) (0.431) (0.325) (0.519) (0.608) (0.271) (0.786) (0.947)
ln(popj) 0.414 -0.589 0.134 0.581 -0.807 -0.450*** -1.471* -0.488***
(0.618) (1.161) (0.592) (0.513) (0.537) (0.101) (0.792) (0.141)
Geographical and cultural variables
ln(dist) -0.933*** -0.853*** -0.835*** -0.793*** -0.621*** -0.571*** -0.465*** -0.409***
(0.031) (0.036) (0.024) (0.030) (0.021) (0.025) (0.025) (0.033)
contig 0.321*** 0.473*** 0.064 0.083 0.132** 0.056 0.160* 0.063
(0.081) (0.087) (0.066) (0.072) (0.058) (0.061) (0.083) (0.087)
comlang 0.661*** 0.964*** 0.804*** 0.925*** 0.660*** 0.764*** 0.544*** 0.721***
(0.075) (0.087) (0.055) (0.063) (0.050) (0.059) (0.055) (0.070)
comcol 0.235 -0.634 0.316* 0.014 0.433*** 0.731*** 0.428*** 0.579***
(0.309) (0.505) (0.161) (0.197) (0.142) (0.167) (0.128) (0.194)
colony 0.660*** 0.483*** 0.543*** 0.457*** 0.388*** 0.296*** 0.456*** 0.328***
(0.073) (0.084) (0.054) (0.062) (0.048) (0.055) (0.052) (0.063)
Control variables
xr 0.342 -1.046** -0.860* -1.351*
(0.591) (0.522) (0.457) (0.767)
fin openi -0.173 -0.125 -0.035 -0.473**
(0.179) (0.162) (0.141) (0.212)
fin openj 0.688 0.258 0.658*** -0.620**
(0.460) (0.315) (0.236) (0.267)
ln(open trai) -0.403* 0.298* -0.017 -0.151
(0.206) (0.177) (0.136) (0.177)
ln(open traj) 0.124 0.713*** 1.029*** 0.539***
(0.284) (0.201) (0.123) (0.162)
h capi 0.742 0.201 0.234 0.725**
(0.456) (0.337) (0.309) (0.334)
h capj 0.836* 0.065 -0.087 -0.600**
(0.452) (0.305) (0.195) (0.254)
polityi 0.010 0.023 -0.001 -0.016
(0.020) (0.016) (0.014) (0.033)
polityj 0.046 -0.005 0.096*** 0.079***
(0.080) (0.042) (0.013) (0.017)
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 58,884 29,709 59,594 32,632 64,532 34,480 37,782 22,478
Note: IPR denotes the index of Campi and Nuvolari (2015) for the agri-food sector, and the index of Ginarte and Park (1997)
for low-, medium-, and high-technology manufacturing sectors. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance level:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
agrees with a significant part of the literature, and it is against the view of FDI
as a means to avoid trade costs (Di Giovanni 2005). Also, we found that sharing
a common language, an indicator of cultural proximity, is positively related
with M&As. Regarding other bilateral-specific variables indicating barriers to
trade, they all increase M&As when they turn out to be significant: contiguity
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(contig), as well as sharing a common colonizer (comcol) and holding colonial
links (colony), both of which might be proxies of institutional similarity.
The control variables, when they are significant, present the expected
signs.14 In contrast to Brakman et al. (2010) who find no significant effect,
we observe that the coefficient of variation of the bilateral exchange rates
decreases M&As in the manufacturing sectors. An improvement in the index of
financial openness is not significant in most cases, although we found a positive
significant effect of the index of the target countries in the medium-technology
sector. In contrast to the findings of Di Giovanni (2005), we observe that
when financial openness of both the acquirer and the target improve, M&As
in high-technology manufactures decreases.
Openness to trade of the acquirer in the agri-food sector decreases M&As.
This could indicate that a firm from a more open economy might decide to
export rather than to invest in the agri-food sector. We observe the opposite
in the low-technology sector. Likewise, a more open target country increases
M&As in the manufacturing sectors, regardless their technological level.
The level of human capital is only significant in agri-food and high-technology
manufacturing and we observe that a higher level of human capital in the target
country increases M&As in agri-food and decreases M&As in high-technology
manufacturing. Conversely, the level of human capital of the acquirer is
associated with greater M&As in the high-technology sector. We should recall
that human capital could be an indicator of the imitation abilities and of its
absorptive capacity. Thus, the results can imply that firms might be less willing
to do M&As in sectors of high-technology if the imitation abilities of the target
are high, but acquirers of high human capital levels might be more likely to do
M&As in high-technology sectors.
Finally, the estimated coefficients of the index of political system in the target
countries are positive in the medium- and high-technology industries, meaning
that an improvement in political institutions fosters M&As in those sectors.
This agrees with Hur et al. (2011), who argue that the quality of institutions
is a relevant determinant of M&As.
As a robustness check, Table 4 displays the results of the PPML estimations
for each of the four groups of M&As with dyadic dummies that capture the
14Note that, in order to deal with a possible omitted variables bias, we performed all the
estimations using country dummies (origin and destination) fixed effects. Therefore, the variables that
are country-specific and that do not strongly change over time, such as the set of control variables
and also IPRs systems, are relatively less stable because country fixed effects are able to capture, up
to a certain extent, their effect.
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Table 4.: PPML estimations of the number of cross-border M&As with country and
dyadic dummies (MAij,k ≥ 0)
Sector Agri-food Low-technology Medium-technology High-technology
IPRs systems
IPRj,agri−food 0.111*
(0.058)
IPRj,manufacture 0.598*** 0.642*** 0.606***
(0.102) (0.093) (0.107)
Country-specific variables
ln(GDPi) 0.759*** 1.277*** 1.441*** 1.378***
(0.213) (0.200) (0.158) (0.206)
ln(GDPj) 1.904*** 0.762** 1.709*** 1.802***
(0.465) (0.302) (0.293) (0.352)
ln(popi) -0.508** -0.371** -0.474 -0.673**
(0.259) (0.179) (0.463) (0.274)
ln(popj) -1.473*** 0.844 -0.819** -2.630***
(0.530) (0.519) (0.369) (0.513)
Control variables
xr 0.473 -1.178** -0.963** -0.751
(0.623) (0.557) (0.451) (0.786)
fin openi -0.205 -0.141 -0.040 -0.392**
(0.171) (0.155) (0.129) (0.186)
fin openj 0.729* 0.253 0.783*** 0.033
(0.433) (0.293) (0.238) (0.277)
ln(open trai) -0.397** 0.301* 0.016 -0.197
(0.195) (0.171) (0.124) (0.166)
ln(open traj) 0.144 0.728*** 0.244 -0.079
(0.258) (0.179) (0.182) (0.189)
h capi 0.837** -0.115 0.151 0.619**
(0.412) (0.287) (0.241) (0.282)
h capj 0.796* -0.128 0.180 -0.716**
(0.429) (0.248) (0.222) (0.281)
polityi 0.013 0.035** -0.007 0.002
(0.019) (0.014) (0.012) (0.028)
polityj -0.002 -0.000 -0.050** -0.109***
(0.068) (0.040) (0.025) (0.039)
Country dummies yes yes yes yes
Dyadic dummies yes yes yes yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 29,709 32,632 34,480 22,478
Note: IPR denotes the index of Campi and Nuvolari (2015) for the agri-food sector, and
the index of Ginarte and Park (1997) for low-, medium-, and high-technology manufacturing
sectors. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.10.
country pairs fixed effects. The signs of the estimated coefficients do not
change with respect to the ones reported in the estimations with country fixed
effects. The main exception is that the political system of the target country
turns out to be negative in the estimations for the sectors of medium- and
high-technology, while in the previous estimations they were positive.
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Likewise, the coefficients of IPRs are positive and significant at the 1% level
in the manufacturing sectors and at a lower level of significance in the agri-food
sector (10%). These robustness checks confirms our previous results regarding
IP protection: an increase in IPRs generates an extension of the number of
M&As in all the sectors considered.
Table 5.: PPML estimations of the number of cross-border M&As with country
dummies (MAij,k ≥ 0)
Sector Agri-food Low-technology Medium-technology High-technology
Model (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
IPRs systems
Enfj×IPRj,agri−food 0.094 0.109*
(0.066) (0.062)
Enfj×IPRj,manufacture 0.373*** 0.404*** 0.435*** 0.462*** 0.437*** 0.416***
(0.093) (0.082) (0.078) (0.074) (0.094) (0.089)
Country-specific variables
ln(GDPi) 0.755*** 0.752*** 1.460*** 1.342*** 1.339*** 1.512*** 1.338*** 1.444***
(0.242) (0.214) (0.224) (0.203) (0.166) (0.164) (0.252) (0.201)
ln(GDPj) 1.928*** 1.935*** 1.104*** 0.724*** 1.563*** 1.807*** 1.348*** 1.608***
(0.492) (0.464) (0.386) (0.246) (0.148) (0.285) (0.210) (0.336)
ln(popi) 0.196 -0.495* 1.204** -0.339* -0.516 0.185 0.546 -0.687***
(0.827) (0.253) (0.533) (0.185) (0.362) (0.488) (0.467) (0.246)
ln(popj) -0.371 -1.517*** 0.935 1.116*** -0.377*** -0.778** -0.467*** -1.215***
(0.911) (0.546) (0.612) (0.430) (0.109) (0.339) (0.150) (0.370)
Geographical and cultural variables
ln(dist) -0.853*** -0.790*** -0.574*** -0.413***
(0.036) (0.030) (0.025) (0.033)
contig 0.472*** 0.088 0.057 0.061
(0.087) (0.071) (0.061) (0.087)
comlang 0.964*** 0.923*** 0.756*** 0.722***
(0.087) (0.062) (0.059) (0.070)
comcol -0.631 0.007 0.720*** 0.554***
(0.505) (0.195) (0.168) (0.194)
colony 0.483*** 0.454*** 0.300*** 0.332***
(0.084) (0.062) (0.055) (0.063)
Control variables
xr 0.356 0.486 -0.957* -1.011* -0.646 -0.680 -1.095 -0.640
(0.592) (0.623) (0.523) (0.556) (0.461) (0.453) (0.771) (0.796)
fin openi -0.177 -0.208 -0.135 -0.165 -0.045 -0.024 -0.460** -0.376**
(0.180) (0.171) (0.162) (0.154) (0.140) (0.128) (0.210) (0.187)
fin openj 0.692 0.738* 0.290 0.352 0.702*** 0.905*** -0.537** 0.030
(0.463) (0.437) (0.321) (0.298) (0.244) (0.238) (0.261) (0.273)
ln(open trai) -0.415** -0.402** 0.267 0.247 -0.030 -0.030 -0.228 -0.249
(0.208) (0.195) (0.181) (0.174) (0.139) (0.125) (0.181) (0.168)
ln(open traj) 0.168 0.181 0.952*** 0.938*** 1.046*** 0.500*** 0.602*** 0.217
(0.276) (0.256) (0.192) (0.172) (0.121) (0.171) (0.156) (0.176)
h capi 0.756* 0.840** 0.195 -0.076 0.146 0.342 0.843*** 0.668**
(0.457) (0.411) (0.338) (0.288) (0.300) (0.246) (0.314) (0.285)
h capj 0.811* 0.749* 0.030 -0.219 -0.128 -0.027 -0.685*** -0.770***
(0.452) (0.430) (0.316) (0.250) (0.205) (0.234) (0.264) (0.299)
polityi 0.010 0.013 0.021 0.033** -0.002 -0.006 -0.017 -0.011
(0.020) (0.019) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.032) (0.027)
polityj 0.041 -0.004 0.003 0.016 0.100*** -0.036 0.079*** -0.055
(0.077) (0.070) (0.042) (0.039) (0.014) (0.025) (0.018) (0.043)
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Dyadic dummies no yes no yes no yes no yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 29,709 29,709 32,256 32,256 33,865 33,865 22,319 22,319
Note: IPR denotes the index of Campi and Nuvolari (2015) for the agri-food sector, and the index of Ginarte and Park (1997)
for low-, medium-, and high-technology manufacturing sectors. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance level:
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
22
August 29, 2018 The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development manuscript
As an additional robustness check, we include a proxy of enforcement of
IPRs and analyze the interaction with the level of IP protection. We include
an interaction term Enfj×IPRj that is expected to reveal the effective level
of IP protection because it discounts the enforcement mechanisms from the
formal or legislative IP protection level for each country. Table 5 shows the
estimation results using country (1) and also dyadic dummies (2) for each
sector.
We observe that this indicator of effective IP protection also increases M&As.
The coefficients of the interaction term Enfj×IPRj are significant and positive
in the same cases as in Tables 3 and 4. This means that an increase in the level
of IP protection that considers both the legislative increase and the effective
enforcement mechanisms, increases M&As.
Therefore, the indexes of IP protection seem to be reflecting in a proper
way the effect of IPRs on M&As. Even more because we use country and
dyadic dummies in order to control for unobserved characteristics, including
differences in enforcement at the country level.
4.3. Interactions between IPRs and imitation abilities of countries
Next, we consider the interaction between imitation abilities of countries and
the strengthening of their IPRs systems. We consider two groups of countries
with low and high imitation abilities and analyze how this feature interacts
with IPRs, adding the interaction variable Low-IAj×IPRj , which is meant to
capture the effect of tightening IPRs in countries with low imitation abilities,
using as the base countries with high imitation abilities. We analyze whether
strengthening IPRs attracts more M&Ass in countries with low imitation
abilities compared to countries with high imitation abilities, or otherwise. We
expect this interaction to have different effects depending on the sector.
Table 6 shows the estimation results. For each sector, we estimate a model
that includes time and country dummies (1), and a model that also includes
dyadic dummies (2). Geographical, cultural, and control variables display the
same signs as the ones reported in the previous estimations.
The index of IPRs is significant in all the estimations –except in model
(1) for the agri-food sector. Including the interaction between the index of
IPRs and imitation abilities of countries reveals an interesting feature of the
effect of IPRs systems on M&As. We find that increasing the strength of
IPRs in countries with low imitation abilities does not have a significantly
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Table 6.: PPML estimations of the number of cross-border M&As. Interaction
between imitation abilities and IPRs systems
Sector Agri-food Low-technology Medium-technology High-technology
Model (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
IPRs systems
IPRj,agri−food 0.094 0.106*
(0.061) (0.058)
Low-IAj×IPRj,agri−food 0.312 0.215
(0.489) (0.396)
IPRj,manufacture 0.489*** 0.552*** 0.464*** 0.664*** 0.554*** 0.662***
(0.122) (0.109) (0.081) (0.102) (0.106) (0.106)
Low-IAj×IPRj,manufacture 0.395 0.352 -0.435*** -0.083 -0.581*** -0.970***
(0.279) (0.240) (0.062) (0.206) (0.110) (0.274)
Country-specific variables
ln(GDPi) 0.766*** 0.753*** 1.438*** 1.490*** 1.446*** 1.435*** 1.274*** 1.407***
(0.240) (0.212) (0.223) (0.208) (0.173) (0.158) (0.240) (0.204)
ln(GDPj) 1.922*** 1.929*** 1.015** 0.809*** 1.016*** 1.592*** 0.536** 1.595***
(0.488) (0.468) (0.417) (0.268) (0.172) (0.305) (0.269) (0.343)
ln(popi) 0.427 -0.504** 0.461 -0.627*** -0.404 -0.491 0.543 -0.800***
(0.410) (0.256) (0.796) (0.214) (0.275) (0.469) (0.931) (0.286)
ln(popj) -0.456 -1.346** 0.666 0.952** -0.174 -0.689** -0.122 -2.274***
(0.758) (0.636) (0.620) (0.447) (0.124) (0.342) (0.184) (0.531)
Geographical and cultural variables
ln(dist) -0.852*** -0.793*** -0.572*** -0.410***
(0.036) (0.030) (0.025) (0.033)
contig 0.473*** 0.082 0.055 0.064
(0.087) (0.072) (0.061) (0.088)
comlang 0.964*** 0.925*** 0.756*** 0.710***
(0.087) (0.063) (0.059) (0.069)
comcol -0.633 0.021 0.613*** 0.482***
(0.505) (0.198) (0.159) (0.184)
colony 0.483*** 0.456*** 0.302*** 0.337***
(0.084) (0.062) (0.055) (0.063)
Control variables
xr 0.334 0.449 -1.016* -1.134** -0.858* -0.983** -1.296* -0.748
(0.589) (0.624) (0.523) (0.558) (0.458) (0.451) (0.765) (0.785)
fin openi -0.173 -0.206 -0.132 -0.160 -0.029 -0.037 -0.476** -0.397**
(0.179) (0.171) (0.163) (0.154) (0.141) (0.129) (0.212) (0.186)
fin openj 0.679 0.703 0.261 0.302 0.759*** 0.748*** -0.545* -0.059
(0.453) (0.434) (0.319) (0.293) (0.243) (0.241) (0.285) (0.277)
ln(open trai) -0.400* -0.389** 0.283 0.272 -0.007 0.019 -0.136 -0.211
(0.206) (0.194) (0.178) (0.170) (0.136) (0.124) (0.177) (0.166)
ln(open traj) 0.152 0.149 0.753*** 0.715*** 1.002*** 0.235 0.509*** -0.098
(0.276) (0.259) (0.204) (0.182) (0.118) (0.185) (0.155) (0.189)
h capi 0.741 0.834** 0.143 -0.025 0.178 0.142 0.681** 0.671**
(0.455) (0.411) (0.339) (0.287) (0.309) (0.242) (0.335) (0.276)
h capj 0.835* 0.790* 0.093 -0.012 -0.493** 0.157 -0.935*** -0.678**
(0.448) (0.428) (0.307) (0.245) (0.211) (0.225) (0.267) (0.283)
polityi 0.010 0.012 0.022 0.024* -0.001 -0.007 -0.016 0.004
(0.020) (0.019) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.033) (0.028)
polityj 0.010 -0.011 -0.020 -0.004 0.061*** -0.049* 0.034** -0.091**
(0.097) (0.095) (0.041) (0.038) (0.013) (0.027) (0.017) (0.041)
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Dyadic dummies no yes no yes no yes no yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 29,709 29,709 32,632 32,632 34,480 34,480 22,478 22,478
Note: IPR denotes the index of Campi and Nuvolari (2015) for the agri-food sector, and the index of Ginarte and Park (1997)
for low-, medium-, and high-technology manufacturing sectors. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance level: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
different effect compared to strengthening IPRs in countries with high imitation
abilities in sectors in which imitation is relatively easy, such as agri-food and
low-technology manufacturing.15 This implies that in sectors where imitation
15Imitation in agriculture can be easy because, generally, access to genetic material provides the
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abilities do not play a relevant role, the strengthening of IPRs is likely to
attract M&As regardless of the imitation abilities of countries.
Instead, in sectors of medium- and high-technology, tightening IPRs systems
in countries with high imitation abilities increases more the number of
M&As than in countries of low imitation abilities. Probably, this is because
countries with low imitation abilities are less likely to imitate a medium- or
high-technology product, regardless of the IP protection provided for those
products. Instead, in countries with high imitation abilities, a stronger IPRs
system –and obviously stronger enforcement of those IPRs– are more relevant
to encourage M&As.
This implies that the incentive provided by strong IPRs systems in sectors
of medium and high-technology content is lower when the risk of imitation
is low. Interestingly, if we look at the estimated effect observed in model (2)
for M&As in the high-technology sector, we observe that, for countries of low
imitation abilities, the net estimated effect of an increase in the index of IPRs
is negative. A plausible explanation for this could be that other characteristics
of these countries, in addition to low imitation abilities, might make this type
of countries not attractive for M&As regardless of their IPRs systems. For
example, given their low capabilities, these countries might not have interesting
firms to be acquired in high-technology sectors. In this case, the negative effect
on an increase in the index of IPRs might be reflecting an incentive to export
to that market rather than to engage in M&As.
4.4. Interactions between IPRs and development level of countries
Finally, as another robustness check, we explore possible heterogeneity on the
effect of IPRs depending on the development level of countries. Although most
countries with low imitation abilities are LDCs, there exist severe differences in
the capabilities of those LDCs to attract M&As and to benefit from technology
transfer (Yi and Naghavi 2017).
Thus, we estimate a new specification of the model that includes an
interaction variable between IPRs and the level of development, that aims
to control for possible link specificities that may derive from some observed
stylized facts: (i) most cross-country M&As are done by DCs, (ii) since 2002,
cross-border M&As towards LDCs have been increasing steadily, and (iii) after
necessary for the reproduction of products. Simplifying, once a producer access a seed, it is highly
probable that he will be able to reproduce it without needing a technological effort.
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the signing of the TRIPS, IP protection has been increasing at higher growth
rates in LDCs.
Table 7.: PPML estimations of the number of cross-border M&As with interaction
variables, country dummies, and dyadic dummies (MAij,k ≥ 0)
Sector Agri-food Low-technology Medium-technology High-technology
Model (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
IPRs systems
IPRj,agri−food -0.029 -0.044
(0.081) (0.075)
LDCj×IPRj,agri−food 0.259** 0.305***
(0.110) (0.103)
IPRj,manufacture 0.203 0.213 0.209* 0.845*** 0.214 0.907***
(0.213) (0.182) (0.108) (0.206) (0.144) (0.257)
LDCj×IPRj,manufacture 0.477** 0.460** 0.200** -0.240 0.268** -0.362
(0.225) (0.179) (0.083) (0.204) (0.114) (0.264)
Country-specific variables
ln(GDPi) 0.711*** 0.678*** 1.471*** 1.255*** 1.462*** 1.441*** 1.308*** 1.379***
(0.242) (0.213) (0.223) (0.200) (0.171) (0.158) (0.245) (0.206)
ln(GDPj) 1.799*** 1.762*** 0.808** 0.910*** 1.843*** 1.790*** 1.593*** 1.889***
(0.484) (0.465) (0.399) (0.287) (0.166) (0.299) (0.229) (0.361)
ln(popi) -0.022 -0.480* 1.049** -0.370** -0.441 -0.455 0.567 -0.673**
(0.820) (0.257) (0.499) (0.178) (0.269) (0.467) (0.459) (0.274)
ln(popj) -0.815 -1.456*** 0.356 0.963** -0.613*** -0.854** -0.699*** -2.590***
(0.556) (0.514) (0.661) (0.485) (0.130) (0.379) (0.183) (0.514)
Geographical and cultural variables
ln(dist) -0.852*** -0.793*** -0.574*** -0.411***
(0.036) (0.030) (0.025) (0.033)
contig 0.472*** 0.082 0.053 0.060
(0.087) (0.071) (0.061) (0.087)
comlang 0.963*** 0.925*** 0.760*** 0.719***
(0.086) (0.063) (0.059) (0.070)
comcol -0.626 0.014 0.708*** 0.557***
(0.505) (0.197) (0.164) (0.192)
colony 0.484*** 0.457*** 0.299*** 0.328***
(0.084) (0.062) (0.055) (0.063)
Control variables
xr 0.306 0.338 -1.057** -1.230** -0.847* -0.929** -1.387* -0.700
(0.594) (0.626) (0.525) (0.563) (0.459) (0.447) (0.773) (0.781)
fin openi -0.167 -0.180 -0.117 -0.118 -0.030 -0.046 -0.470** -0.393**
(0.180) (0.171) (0.163) (0.157) (0.141) (0.129) (0.210) (0.186)
fin openj 0.649 0.665 0.307 0.315 0.753*** 0.746*** -0.531* 0.035
(0.451) (0.428) (0.323) (0.302) (0.240) (0.239) (0.278) (0.272)
ln(open trai) -0.397* -0.370* 0.290 0.302* -0.025 0.018 -0.171 -0.193
(0.207) (0.192) (0.177) (0.171) (0.136) (0.124) (0.178) (0.166)
ln(open traj) 0.035 0.060 0.648*** 0.708*** 0.869*** 0.254 0.377** -0.044
(0.274) (0.257) (0.207) (0.180) (0.139) (0.180) (0.173) (0.187)
h capi 0.754* 0.816** 0.189 -0.111 0.255 0.159 0.784** 0.631**
(0.457) (0.410) (0.337) (0.287) (0.310) (0.241) (0.310) (0.281)
h capj 0.736* 0.685 0.235 0.183 0.143 0.074 -0.370 -0.888***
(0.443) (0.423) (0.321) (0.275) (0.232) (0.236) (0.280) (0.302)
polityi 0.008 0.006 0.022 0.034** -0.001 -0.007 -0.015 0.002
(0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.032) (0.028)
polityj 0.011 -0.040 -0.014 -0.005 0.113*** -0.045* 0.097*** -0.101***
(0.077) (0.065) (0.041) (0.039) (0.016) (0.026) (0.020) (0.038)
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Dyadic dummies no yes no yes no yes no yes
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 29,709 29,709 32,632 32,632 34,480 34,480 22,478 22,478
Note: IPR denotes the index of Campi and Nuvolari (2015) for the agri-food sector, and the index of Ginarte and Park (1997)
for low-, medium-, and high-technology manufacturing sectors. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Significance level: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.
In order to consider the possible implications of these features, we include
the interaction variable LDCj×IPRj , which is meant to capture the effect of
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strengthening IPRs in LDCs independently of the level of development of the
acquirer country. This aims to investigate whether LDCs attract more M&As
as a consequence of a tightening of their IPRs system compared to DCs.
Table 7 displays the estimation results. In model (1) we use country
dummies and in model (2) we also include dyadic dummies. Note that
geographical, cultural, and control variables, all display the same signs reported
by the previous estimations. The index of IPRs looses significance in some
specifications, but the interaction terms are positive and significant in all
sectors. These estimations conclude that, when LDCs tighten their IPRs
systems, they receive a higher number of M&As compared to DCs, in all
sectors, regardless of their technological content.
5. Concluding remarks
Considering the recent global process of strengthening and harmonization of
IPRs systems and the significance of cross-border M&As as the most relevant
form of FDI, we have analyzed the effect of IPRs on M&As using a gravity
model for the post-TRIPS period.
The estimation results confirm that market size, geographical factors, trade
barriers, and cultural proximity among countries are important determinants
of cross-border M&As. The strengthening of IPRs systems increases M&As,
not only in sectors that are likely to be more IP-intensive, but also in all the
sectors regardless their technological content: agri-food, low-, medium-, and
high-technology manufactures. These results are robust when considering the
effective IP protection by discounting the effect of enforcement mechanisms.
Several authors have shown that access to IP assets is one of the driving
forces for firms to engage in M&As (Bryer and Simensky 2002; Marco and
Rausser 2002). In line with this evidence, at the country level, our estimations
show that IPRs systems protecting these IP assets also affect decisions on
cross-border M&As.
In addition, we found that the effect of stronger IPRs depends on the
imitation abilities of countries –being more relevant in countries with high
imitation abilities– but also that this interaction is more important in sectors
of medium- and high-technology content. In line with the findings of Smith
(1999) for the case of trade, we observe that the effect of IPRs interacts with
imitation abilities of countries. Finally, we found that the increase in M&As
derived from a strengthening of IPRs systems is higher for developing countries
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compared with developed countries. These results indicate that both imitation
abilities and the level of development of countries influence firms’ responses to
national differences in IPRs systems.
These results should be interpreted with caution for two main reasons. First,
the decision of a firm to engage in M&As is closely related to the decision of
exporting, and these processes can be complementary or substitute. Therefore,
the interaction between imitation threat and IPRs systems not only affects
M&As but also can have an impact on firms’ exports and license that we
are not able to observe in this analysis. Similarly to the empirical study of
Smith (2001) for the case of the US, a possible interesting research extension
would be to empirically investigate how stronger IPRs simultaneously affect
trade, licensing, FDI, and technology transfer, at the country level. Secondly,
although most products of high-technology content are relatively more difficult
to be copied, some of them, such as pharmaceutical products, can be easily
imitated and they are one of the most IP-intensive products. The sectoral
aggregation estimates the average effect, but studies using more disaggreated
data would be useful.
However, the robustness of the results allows us to stress the relevant role of
IPRs in attracting cross-border M&As and that this role depends on sectoral
and countries’ characteristics. Our analysis has some relevant implications for
the design of IPRs systems, especially for developing countries.
Firstly, the different effects of IPRs imply that a more cautious approach
towards the process of harmonization of IPRs systems should be in place as
there might be no unique system optimal for all countries. This challenges
the adequacy of globally harmonized IPRs systems that do not consider
technological capabilities and development levels of countries.
Secondly, considering that stronger IPRs mainly increase M&As directed
to the developing world, one should examine whether and how beneficial
it is for LDCs to attract more investments in the form of M&As. Several
economic models and empirical analysis argue that FDI would bring benefits
to LDCs, especially by transferring technology and by generating economic
growth. However, our estimations show that M&As in sectors or medium- and
high-technology transfer are less likely to increase with a strengthening of IPRs
when the imitation abilities of countries are low, which is frequently observed
in LDCs.
Also, several scholars have raised concerns regarding FDI that derive from
the frequent and unexpected reversals of FDI flows, the transfer of control
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of domestic companies, which can lead to problems of adverse selection or
excessive leverage, or the concentration of IP assets in foreign companies (see,
for example, Albuquerque 2003; Krugman 2000). Thus, the increase in M&As
derived from tightening IPRs systems could be beneficial for DCs but could
instead hurt LDCs, as suggested by Helpman (1993), although this would be
determined by imitation, innovation, and market features of the countries.
Finally, because IPRs systems are likely to affect not only decisions of firms
related to M&As but also trade and licensing, the design of IPRs systems
should also consider the possible effect on these decisions and the implications
for countries in terms of innovation, technology transfer, and development.
29
August 29, 2018 The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development manuscript
References
Adams, S. (2010). Intellectual property rights, investment climate and FDI in
developing countries. International Business Research 3 (3), 201–209.
Ahammad, M. F., Z. Konwar, N. Papageorgiadis, C. Wang, and J. Inbar (2018).
R&d capabilities, intellectual property strength and choice of equity ownership
in cross-border acquisitions: evidence from brics acquirers in e urope. R&D
Management 48 (2), 177–194.
Albuquerque, R. (2003). The composition of international capital flows: risk sharing
through foreign direct investment. Journal of International Economics 61 (2),
353–383.
Anderson, J. (2011). The gravity model. Annual Review of Economics 3 (1), 133–160.
Baldwin, R. and D. Taglioni (2006). Gravity for dummies and dummies for gravity
equations. NBER Working Papers 12516.
Bessen, J. E. (2003). Patent thickets: Strategic patenting of complex technologies.
Available at SSRN 327760 .
Blonigen, B. A. (1997). Firm-specific assets and the link between exchange rates and
foreign direct investment. The American Economic Review 87 (3), 447–465.
Blonigen, B. A. (2005). A review of the empirical literature on FDI determinants.
Atlantic Economic Journal 33 (4), 383–403.
Brakman, S., G. Garita, H. Garretsen, and C. van Marrewijk (2010). Economic and
financial integration and the rise of cross-border M&As. In P. A. G. van Bergeijk
and S. Brakman (Eds.), The Gravity Model in International Trade. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Brander, J. A., V. Cui, and I. Vertinsky (2017). China and intellectual property rights:
A challenge to the rule of law. Journal of International Business Studies 48 (7),
908–921.
Bryer, L. and M. Simensky (2002). Intellectual property assets in mergers and
acquisitions, Volume 12. John Wiley & Sons.
Burger, M., F. v. Oort, and G. Linders (2009). On the specification of the gravity
model of trade: Zeros, excess zeros and zero-inflated estimation. Research Paper
ERS-2009-003-ORG Revision, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM).
Campi, M. and M. Duen˜as (2016). Intellectual property rights and international trade
of agricultural products. World Development 80, 1–18.
Campi, M. and A. Nuvolari (2015). Intellectual property protection in plant varieties.
a new worldwide index (1961-2011). Research Policy 44 (4), 951–964.
Chinn, M. D. and H. Ito (2008). A new measure of financial openness. Journal of
Comparative Policy Analysis 10 (3), 309–322.
Chinn, M. D. and H. Ito (2014). Notes on the Chinn-Ito Financial Openness Index
2012. Update, available at:http://web.pdx.edu/˜ito/Chinn-Ito website.htm.
30
August 29, 2018 The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development manuscript
Cohen, W. M., R. R. Nelson, and J. P. Walsh (2000). Protecting their intellectual
assets: Appropriability conditions and why US manufacturing firms patent (or not),
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Connolly, M. (2003). The dual nature of trade: measuring its impact on imitation and
growth. Journal of Development Economics 72 (1), 31–55.
Courdacier, N., R. De Santis, and A. Aviat (2009). Cross-border Mergers and
Acquisitions: Financial and Institutional Forces, ECB Working Paper.
Cuevas, A., M. Messmacher, and A. Werner (2005). Foreign direct investment in
Mexico since the approval of NAFTA. The World Bank Economic Review 19 (3),
473–488.
Delgado, M., M. Kyle, and A. M. McGahan (2013). Intellectual property protection
and the geography of trade. The Journal of Industrial Economics 61 (3), 733–762.
Di Giovanni, J. (2005). What drives capital flows? The case of cross-border M&A
activity and financial deepening. Journal of International Economics 65 (1),
127–149.
Duen˜as, M. and G. Fagiolo (2013). Modeling the international-trade network: a gravity
approach. Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination 8 (1), 155–178.
Duen˜as, M., R. Mastrandrea, M. Barigozzi, and G. Fagiolo (2017). Spatio-temporal
patterns of the international merger and acquisition network. Scientific
Reports 7-1 (10789).
Erel, I., R. C. Liao, and M. S. Weisbach (2012). Determinants of cross-border mergers
and acquisitions. The Journal of Finance 67 (3), 1045–1082.
Feenstra, R. C. (1998). Integration of trade and disintegration of production in the
global economy. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 12 (4), 31–50.
Feenstra, R. C., R. Inklaar, and M. P. Timmer (2013). The Next Generation of the
Penn World Table, available for download at www.ggdc.net/pwt.
Fink, C. (2005). Intellectual Property Rights and U.S. and German International
Transactions in Manufacturing Industries. In C. Fink and K. Maskus (Eds.),
Intellectual Property and Development: Lessons from Recent Economic Research.
World Bank Publications.
Fink, C. and K. E. Maskus (2005). Intellectual Property and Development: Lessons
from Recent Economic Research. World Bank Publications.
Foley, C. F., R. Fisman, and L. G. Branstetter (2006). Do stronger intellectual property
rights increase international technology Ttransfer? Empirical evidence from US
firm-level panel data. Quaterly Journal of Economics 121 (1), 321–348.
Frankel, J., E. Stein, and S. Wei (1995). Trading blocs and the Americas: The natural,
the unnatural, and the super natural. Journal of Development Economics 47 (1),
6195.
Gaffney, N., R. Karst, and J. Clampit (2016). Emerging market MNE cross-border
acquisition equity participation: The role of economic and knowledge distance.
31
August 29, 2018 The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development manuscript
International Business Review 25 (1), 267–275.
Ginarte, J. and W. Park (1997). Determinants of patent rights: A cross-national study.
Research Policy 26 (3), 283–301.
Hatzichronoglou, T. (1997). Revision of the High-Technology Sector and Product
Classification. Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers, 1997/02.
Helpman, E. (1993). Innovation, imitation, and intellectual property rights.
Econometrica 61 (6), 1247–1280.
Helpman, E. (2006). Trade, FDI, and the organization of firms. Journal of Economic
Literature 44 (3), 589–630.
Herger, N., C. Kotsogiannis, and S. McCorriston (2008). Cross-border acquisitions in
the global food sector. European Review of Agricultural Economics 35 (4), 563–587.
Hur, J., R. A. Parinduri, and Y. E. Riyanto (2011). Cross-border M&A inflows
and quality of country governance: developing versus developed countries. Pacific
Economic Review 16 (5), 638–655.
Hyun, H.-J. and H. H. Kim (2010). The determinants of cross-border M&As: the
role of institutions and financial development in the gravity model. The World
Economy 33 (2), 292–310.
Ivus, O. (2010). Do stronger patent rights raise high-tech exports to the developing
world? Journal of International Economics 81 (1), 38–47.
Kalanje, C. M. (2002). Intellectual property, foreign direct investment and the
least-developed countries. The Journal of World Intellectual Property 5 (1),
119–128.
Krugman, P. (2000). Fire-sale FDI. In Capital flows and the emerging economies:
theory, evidence, and controversies, pp. 43–58. University of Chicago Press.
Lall, S. (2000). The technological structure and performance of developing country
manufactured exports, 1985-98. Oxford Development Studies 28 (3), 337–369.
Lesser, W. (2002). The effects of intellectual property rights on foreign direct
investment and imports in developing countries. IP Strategy Today 5 (1), 1–16.
Mansfield, E. (1995). Intellectual property protection, direct investment, and technology
transfer: Germany, Japan, and the United States, Volume 27. World Bank
Publications.
Marco, A. C. and G. C. Rausser (2002). Mergers and intellectual property in
agricultural biotechnology. In R. Evenson, V. Santaniello, and D. Zilberman
(Eds.), Economic and social issues in agricultural biotechnology. Wallingford: CABI
Publishing.
Maskus, K. E. (2000). Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy. Washington
DC: Peterson Institute.
Maskus, K. E. (2012). Private rights and public problems: the global economics of
intellectual property in the 21st century. Washington DC: Peterson Institute.
Maskus, K. E. and M. Penubarti (1995). How trade-related are intellectual property
32
August 29, 2018 The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development manuscript
rights? Journal of International Economics 39 (3), 227–248.
McManis, C. R. (1997). Intellectual property and international mergers and
acquisitions. U. Cin. L. Rev. 66, 1283.
Nicholson, M. W. (2007). The impact of industry characteristics and IPR policy on
foreign direct investment. Review of World Economics 143 (1), 27–54.
Nunnenkamp, P. and J. Spatz (2004). Intellectual property rights and foreign direct
investment: a disaggregated analysis. Review of World Economics 140 (3), 393–414.
OECD (2011). ISIC REV. 3 Technology Intensity Definition.
www.oecd.org/sti/ind/48350231.pdf.
Papageorgiadis, N., A. R. Cross, and C. Alexiou (2014). International patent systems
strength 1998–2011. Journal of World Business 49 (4), 586–597.
Papageorgiadis, N. and F. McDonald (2018). Defining and measuring the institutional
context of national intellectual property systems in a post-trips world. Journal of
International Management .
Park, W. (2008). International patent protection: 1960–2005. Research Policy 37 (4),
761–766.
Pavitt, K. (1984). Sectoral patterns of technical change: towards a taxonomy and a
theory. Research Policy 13 (6), 343–373.
Rossi, S. and P. F. Volpin (2004). Cross-country determinants of mergers and
acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics 74 (2), 277–304.
Santos Silva, J. M. C. and S. Tenreyro (2006). The log of gravity. The Review of
Economics and Statistics 88 (4), 641–658.
Seyoum, B. (1996). The impact of intellectual property rights on foreign direct
investment. The Columbia Journal of World Business 31 (1), 50–59.
Shin, W., K. Lee, and W. G. Park (2016). When an importer’s protection of IPR
interacts with an exporter’s level of technology: Comparing the impacts on the
exports of the North and South. The World Economy 39 (6), 772–802.
Smarzynska, J. B. (2004). The composition of foreign direct investment and protection
of intellectual property rights: Evidence from transition economies. European
Economic Review 48 (1), 39–62.
Smith, P. J. (1999). Are weak patent rights a barrier to us exports? Journal of
International Economics 48 (1), 151–177.
Smith, P. J. (2001). How do foreign patent rights affect US exports, affiliate sales, and
licenses? Journal of International Economics 55 (2), 411–439.
UNCTAD (2001). World Investment Report 2000. United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development .
Wong, W.-K. (2008). Comparing the fit of the gravity model for different cross-border
flows. Economics Letters 99 (3), 474–477.
Yang, G. and K. E. Maskus (2001). Intellectual property rights and licensing: An
econometric investigation. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 137 (1), 58–79.
33
August 29, 2018 The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development manuscript
Yi, X. and A. Naghavi (2017). Intellectual property rights, FDI, and technological
development. The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development 26 (4),
410–424.
34
August 29, 2018 The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development manuscript
Appendix A
List of Acquirer Countries
Developed Countries
Australia; Austria; Canada; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland;
France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Latvia;
Lithuania; Malta; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Poland; Portugal;
Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland,Liechtenstein; United
Kingdom; United States.
Developing Countries
Albania; Angola; Azerbaijan; Argentina; Bangladesh; Bolivia; Brazil; Bulgaria;
Belarus; Cameroon; Central African Republic; Sri Lanka; Chad; Chile; China;
Colombia; Costa Rica; Croatia; Cyprus; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; El
Salvador; Ethiopia; Fiji; Gabon; Georgia; Ghana; Grenada; Guatemala;
Honduras; Hong Kong SAR, China; Indonesia; Iran, Islamic Rep.; Israel; Cte
d’Ivoire; Jamaica; Jordan; Kenya; Korea, Rep.; Kyrgyz Republic; Madagascar;
Malawi; Malaysia; Mauritania; Mauritius; Mexico; Taiwan; Moldova; Morocco;
Mozambique; Oman; Nepal; Niger; Nigeria; Pakistan; Panama; Paraguay;
Peru; Philippines; Russian Federation; Rwanda; Saudi Arabia; Senegal; Sierra
Leone; India; Singapore; Vietnam; South Africa; Zimbabwe; Thailand; Togo;
Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Uganda; Ukraine; Macedonia, FYR;
Egypt, Arab Rep.; Tanzania; Uruguay; Uzbekistan; Venezuela; Zambia.
List of Target Countries
Developed Countries
Australia; Austria; Canada; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; Finland;
France; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Latvia;
Lithuania; Malta; Netherlands; New Zealand; Norway; Poland; Portugal;
Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland,Liechtenstein; United
Kingdom; United States.
Developing Countries
Azerbaijan; Argentina; Brazil; Bulgaria; Belarus; Sri Lanka; Chad; Chile;
China; Colombia; Congo, Rep.; Costa Rica; Croatia; Cyprus; Ecuador; El
Salvador; Fiji; Gabon; Ghana; Guatemala; Honduras; Hong Kong SAR,
China; Indonesia; Israel; Jamaica; Jordan; Kenya; Korea, Rep.; Malaysia;
Mauritius; Mexico; Taiwan; Moldova; Morocco; Oman; Nigeria; Pakistan;
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Panama; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Russian Federation; Saudi Arabia;
India; Singapore; Vietnam; South Africa; Zimbabwe; Thailand; Trinidad and
Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; Uganda; Ukraine; Macedonia, FYR; Egypt, Arab
Rep.; Uruguay; Venezuela; Zambia.
Appendix B: Technological classification of industries
Classification Industrial Sectors - Products SIC Codes
Agri-food
-Agricultural Products Crops, livestock and animal
specialities, agricultural services,
forestry
01, 02, 07, 08
-Food Food and kindred products,
preparation of meats/fruits,
beverages, vegetable oils, tobacco
manufacturing
20, 21
Low-technology industries
-Textile/fashion cluster Textile fabrics, clothing, headgear,
footwear, leather manufactures, travel
goods
22, 23, 31
-Other low technology Pottery, simple metal
parts/structures, wood products,
furniture, jewelry, toys, plastic
products
24, 25, 26, 27, 30 (except
3011, 3087, 3089), 3631,
3652, 39
Medium-technology industries
-Automotive products Transportation equipment, passenger
vehicles and parts, commercial
vehicles, motorcycles and parts
37 (except 3721, 3724, 3728,
3761, 3764, 3769)
-Medium-technology
process industries
Synthetic bres, chemicals and paints,
fertilizers, plastics, iron, pipes/tubes,
petroleum refining and related
industries
28 (except: 2833-2836), 29,
32, 33, 34
-Medium-technology
engineering industries
Engines, motors, industrial
machinery, pumps, switch-gear,
ships, watches
3011, 3087, 3089, 35 (except
3511, 3571, 3572, 3575,
3577), 36 (except 3631,
3652, 3663, 3669, 3671,
3672, 3674-3676, 3679),
3821
High-technology industries
-Electronics and
electrical products
Office/data
processing/telecommunications
equipment, TVs, transistors, turbines,
power-generating equipment
3511, 3571, 3572, 3575, 3577,
3661, 3663, 3669, 3671, 3672,
3674-3676, 3679
-Other high-technology Pharmaceuticals, aerospace,
optical/measuring instruments,
cameras
2833-2836, 38 (except 3821),
3721, 3724, 3728, 3761, 3764,
3769
36
